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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Case No. 20060009-SC

vs.
DARREN NEIL GREUBER, JR.,
DefendanVPetitioner.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of
Appeals. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(5) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE 1
An error by counsel warrants setting aside a criminal judgment only
when it affects the outcome of the proceedings and deprives the
defendant of a substantive or procedural right. Defendant claims that
but for his counsel's alleged error, he would have accepted a plea
bargain. Was defendant deprived of a substantive or procedural right?
ISSUE 2
Did the trial court clearly err in finding that defendant would not have
accepted a plea bargain, where there was no bargain to accept and both
of defendant's attorneys testified that he would not have pled guilty to
murder?

Standards ofReview. On certiorari review, this Court must determine whether
the court of appeals accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the
appropriate standard of review. See State v. On, 2005 UT 92, \ 7,127 P.3d 1213.
Where a trial court has taken evidence on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
the claim presents a mixed question of fact and law to the appellate court. See State
v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1253 (Utah 1993). The appellate court reviews the trial
court's factual findings for clear error and any legal conclusion for correctness. Id.;
Utah R. App. P. 23B(g) ("The findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are
reviewable under the same standards as the review of findings of fact in other
appeals.")
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
United States Constitution, Amendment VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

On October 30, 2001, the State charged defendant by information with one
count of murder and one count of aggravated kidnapping (R. 4A-4C, 116-18). A
jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 160-61; 232:84). The court sentenced
defendant to consecutive prison terms of five years to life and fifteen years to life (R.
190-91). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court (R. 209). This Court
transferred the case to the court of appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4)
(West2004)(R.228).
In that court, defendant claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. Br. Aplt. at
19-22. He did not claim, however, that his counsel's alleged deficiency prejudiced
his right to a fair trial. Br. Aplt. at 20. Rather, he claimed that counsel's conduct
denied him a fair opportunity to accept a plea bargain from the State. Br. Aplt. at
21-22. He also claimed that the trial court had made a clearly erroneous factual
finding during a rule 23B remand from the court of appeals. Br. Aplt. at 22-24.
The court of appeals affirmed defendant's conviction. It first ruled that under
this Court's decisions in State v. Geary and State v. Knight, defendant had no right to
a plea bargain. See State v. Grueber, 2005 UT App 480U, ^ff 4-5. Consequently,
defendant's loss of a fair opportunity to accept a plea offer did not constitute

3

prejudice. Id. The court also held that the challenged factual finding was supported
by the record. Id. at 6-7.
This Court granted defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari.
SUMMARY OF FACTS

On the evening of October 9, 2001, defendant and several members of the
Silent Aryan Warriors (S. A.W.) kidnapped Don Dorton (R. 229:39,48-49,51). They
covered his head and upper torso with a sheet, duct taped his wrists and ankles, and
drove him to a rural area of Salt Lake County (R. 229:49,54-55,110; State's Ex. Nos.
3, 4, 5, 6, 7). Defendant dragged Dorton thirty feet off the road and dropped an
eighty-three pound rock on his head (R. 229:56, 59, 62-63,114; 230:107). The rock
crushed Dorton's skull, killing him (229:116,124-25,141).
The State charged defendant with one count of murder and one count of
aggravated kidnapping (R, 4A-4C, 116-18). At the first roll call, on November 13,
2001, the State made an oral plea offer of one count of murder in exchange for
dropping the aggravated kidnapping charge (R. 452; 458:60-61). Defense counsel
conveyed the plea offer to defendant, who quickly rejected it because he did not
want to plead guilty to murder (R. 453; 458:14, 27, 41-42, 64, 76). Defendant
understood from his attorneys that the murder charge would ultimately set the
amount of time the Board of Pardons kept him in prison (R. 453; 458:14-15,41-42,
76). He and his attorneys concluded that "the marginal cost... of the aggravated
4

kidnapping count wasn't worth consideration, because [defendant] would still be
talking about at least 20 years" (R. 453; 458:42). Moreover, defendant maintained his
innocence of the crime, and "the difference between being convicted of one count
and being convicted of both counts wasn't enough to cause him to plead guilty to
something that he didn't do" (R. 458:15-16,42). Trial counsel thus determined that
it was fruitless to approach defendant with any plea deals that involved pleading to
murder (R. 458:45).
Defendant and his attorneys believed that they had a viable defense based on
the impeachability of the State's witnesses (R. 458:6, 28-29). The State had no
physical evidence connecting defendant to the murder (R. 229:23-24). Rather, its
case consisted of the testimony of co-defendants, who were drug addicts and
members of S.A.W. (R. 229:23-24; 453; 458:6, 28). The State also had a jailhouse
informant, David Corcoran, to whom defendant had confessed while incarcerated in
the Davis County Jail (R. 229:16; 230:70-72; 454; 458:6-7). Defendant told his
attorneys that he did not confess to Corcoran, but that Corcoran had learned the
facts of the kidnapping and murder either by reading defendant's discovery or by
speaking with Larry Rasmussen, a S.A.W. leader and co-defendant in the case (R.
454-55; 458:7, 14). Defendant gave his counsel the name of an inmate, Floyd
McCallister, who would testify that Corcoran had told him that he read defendant's
discovery (R. 458:13-14, 50-51). Defendant did not tell his counsel, however, that
5

Corcoran was transferred out of his cell and had no further contact with defendant
before defendant received his discovery (R. 455; 458:51-52).
Before trial, in response to defendant's discovery request, the State disclosed
the existence of several recordings of defendant's telephone calls from jail (R. 38,
453). Defendant's trial counsel did not request or listen to the recordings of
defendant's telephone calls before trial (R. 454; 458:35-36). In some of the phone
calls that were made after Corcoran had been transferred out of defendant's cell,
defendant stated that he had not yet received his discovery (R. 455; 458:8, 47, 77).
On the first day of trial, in opening statements, defense counsel pointed out
that the State had no physical evidence connecting defendant to Dorton's death (R.
229:23-24). Counsel added that the State's entire case hinged on the testimony of a
few methamphetamine addicts who were affiliated with S. A.W. (R. 229:23). Counsel
did not intimate, however, what evidence defendant would present or whether
defendant would testify (R. 229:19-26).
The State's presentation of evidence included testimony from defendant's
cellmate, David Corcoran, that defendant had confessed while in jail (R. 230:68,7175). Corcoran also testified that defendant had asked him to help arrange an alibi
(R. 230:77-78). When Corcoran was transferred to another section of the jail,
defendant gave him two letters, which the State presented at trial, instructing
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Corcoran to contact defendant's cousin and ask her to arrange an alibi for defendant
(R. 230:78,82-83; State's Ex. Nos. 18C, 18D).
After the State rested, defendant recalled the State's case manager, Courtney
Nelson (R. 231:81,86-87). Following Nelson's testimony, defense counsel told the
court, in the presence of the jury, that he intended to call two more witnesses: Floyd
McCallister and defendant (R. 231:115). The court called a recess so that defense
counsel could have Mr. McCallister transported from the jail (R. 231:115). During
the recess, defendant's trial counsel listened, at the State's suggestion, to the audio
recordings of defendant's jailhouse telephone calls described in the State's Fourth
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery (R. 231:116,120-22). Trial counsel
concluded that the contents of the recordings made it impossible for "ethical or
other considerations" to present testimony from either McCallister or defendant (R.
231:122). Defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on ineffective assistance of
counsel and failure by the State to provide adequate discovery (R. 231:120-23). The
trial court denied the mistrial motion, but offered to give a curative instruction to
the jury (R. 231:128-29).
The court remained in recess until the next morning (R. 231:129). When the
jury returned to the courtroom, the court explained that defendant would not
present any further evidence and instructed the jury not to draw any negative
inferences from defendant's decision not to present any evidence (R. 232:12-13).
7

The jury found defendant guilty as charged (R. 160-61; 232:84). The court
sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms for both charges, and defendant
appealed (R. 190, 209; 250:16-17).
On appeal, defendant requested and was granted a remand under rule 23B,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to supplement the record with findings
regarding his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (R. 261-72, 293-94). He
asserted in his remand motion that counsel was deficient for not listening to the
recordings before trial and that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him
because, had he known of the tapes, he would have accepted the State's plea bargain
(R. 271)
At the evidentiary hearing on remand, defendant testified that if his counsel
had informed him of the recordings, he would have accepted the State's plea
bargain (R. 458:9). Both of his attorneys, however, testified that he would not have
accepted a plea bargain even had they listened to the recordings before trial. The
trial court found that "defendant would not have accepted the plea offer from the
State because he did not want to plead guilty to the charge of Murder" (R. 456).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I. Defendant may not predicate a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel on a lost plea bargain. The right to effective counsel exists only to protect
those substantive and procedural rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and
8

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

There is neither a

substantive nor a procedural right to a plea bargain.
POINT II. The trial court's finding that defendant would not have accepted a
plea bargain is not clearly erroneous. Defendant unequivocally rejected the State's
plea bargain almost two months before his phone calls were provided to his
attorneys. Moreover, both of defendant's attorneys said that he would not have
accepted a plea offer, because he did not want to plead guilty to murder. The only
evidence that defendant would have accepted the plea bargain was defendant's selfserving testimony.
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT HAS NO SUBSTANTIVE OR PROCEDURAL
RIGHT TO A PLEA BARGAIN; THUS, LOSS OF A PLEA
BARGAIN CANNOT CONSTITUTE PREJUDICE IN AN
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM

Defendant claims that the court of appeals erred in holding that his counsel
was not ineffective.

Br. Pet. at 12-17. Specifically, he asserts that the court

incorrectly determined that a lost plea bargain does constitute prejudice under the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Br. Pet. at 12-17. Defendant agrees that he is
not entitled to a plea bargain. Br. Pet. at 12. He argues instead that any deficient
performance by counsel that affects the outcome of the plea process is sufficient to
establish a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Br. Aplt. at 13-14.
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Defendant's claim is foreclosed by this Court's decisions in State v. Knight, 734
P.2d 913, 919 n.7 (Utah 1987), and State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645,646 (Utah 1985). He
thus asks this Court to overrule Knight. Br. Pet. at 16.l
A. Defendant must overcome a substantial burden of persuasion to
overturn State v. Knight.
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, "the first decision by a court of a particular
question of law governs later decisions by the same court." State v. Menzies, 889
P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994). Stare decisis is "a cornerstone of Anglo-American
jurisprudence" and is "crucial to the predictability of the law and the fairness of
adjudication." Id. Thus, "[tjhose asking [this Court] to overturn prior precedent
have a substantial burden of persuasion." Id. at 398. To satisfy this burden, the
party seeking to overturn precedent must clearly convince the Court either that (1)
"the rule was originally erroneous" or (2) that the rule "is no longer sound because
of changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing from
precedent." Id. at 399. Defendant has done neither.
The rule defendant seeks to overturn—that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel guarantees fair trials, not plea bargains—has been in place for nearly

Defendant does not acknowledge Geary. See Br. Pet. at ii-iv, 12-17.
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twenty-one years in Utah. It was first announced in State v. Geary and later
reaffirmed in State v. Knight
Geary complained that his trial counsel in a rape trial failed to determine
before trial that defendant's knife was not the knife that cut the victim's blouse. Id.
at 646. Geary asserted that had counsel done so, it would have forced a plea bargain
with the prosecutor. Id. This Court rejected his claim and held that his counsel's
failure to secure a plea bargain was not prejudice under the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel: "[Geary] loses sight of the fact that our state and federal constitutions
guarantee fair trials, not plea bargains." Id.
Two years later, Knight claimed in his appeal from an aggravated robbery
conviction that the prosecution improperly withheld contact information for some
of its witnesses. Knight, 734 P.2d at 916. He also claimed that withholding the
information caused his counsel to be ineffective in advising him to reject a plea offer.
Id. at 919 n.7. This Court held that Knight was not denied his right to the effective
assistance of counsel when he rejected the plea offer and went to trial:
We have previously rejected claims alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel when a defendant has rejected a plea bargain and has retained
his or her right to a fair trial... "[Defendant] loses site of the fact that
our state and federal constitutions guarantee fair trials, not plea
bargains."
Id. (quoting Geary, 707 P.2d at 646) (alteration in Knight).
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In the instant appeal, defendant does not claim that Knight "is no longer
sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by
departing from precedent." Menzies 889 P.2d at 399. He claims only that Knight
was erroneously decided. Br. Pet. at 16-17 ("To the extent that Knight stands for the
proposition that a defendant is not entitled to effective assistances of counsel during
plea negotiations, it is at odds with the state and federal constitutions as interpreted
by the law cited above."). But defendant has failed to show that Knight and Geary
were incorrect.
B.

Knight and Geary are consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
The U.S. Supreme Court has never considered the issue this Court confronted

in Knight and Geary—whether the Sixth Amendment is violated by counsel's
mistakes that cause a defendant to reject a plea bargain and retain his right to a fair
trial. But this Court's decisions in Knight and Geary are consistent with Court's Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence.
One of the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment is the right to the assistance of
counsel at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding. See Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963). If a
defendant is denied the assistance of counsel in a critical stage of the proceeding,
prejudice is presumed. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,692 (1984) ("Actual
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or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to
result in prejudice"); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,659 n.25 (1984) ("The Court
has uniformly found constitutional error without any showing of prejudice when
counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a
critical stage of the proceeding/7).
But where a defendant has counsel and that counsel performs deficiently, the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated only if the defendant was prejudiced
by the deficient conduct: "An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable,
does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error
had no effect on the judgment/7 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92. This is because "the
right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but
because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial/7
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658. In other words, the Sixth Amendment guarantees
defendants a fair trial as defined by express rights promised in that Amendment.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684-85. And effective counsel is necessary not because it is an
express right, but because it is necessary to protect those express rights. Id.
Because the right to the effective assistance of counsel is derived from the
guarantee of other Sixth Amendment rights, the protections it affords are
circumscribed by the scope of those rights. The U.S. Supreme Court observed as
much in its most recent opinion on the right to counsel:
13

[OJur recognition of the right to the effective assistance of counsel
within the Sixth Amendment was a consequence of our perception that
representation by counsel is critical to the ability of the adversarial
system to produce just results... Having derived the right to effective
representation from the purpose of ensuring a fair trial,, we have,
logically enough, also derived the limits of that right from that same
purpose.
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, No. 05-352, slip op. at 6 (June 26,2006) (citations and
quotations omitted).
Thus, the right to effective assistance of counsel is "explicitly tied to the
defendant's right to a fundamentally fair trial—a trial in which the determination of
guilt or innocence is 'just' and 'reliable/'7 Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365,39293 (1986) (Powell, J. concurring in the judgment) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 68586, 696). And, "[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (emphasis added); see also Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364,
368 (1993) ("Our decisions have emphasized that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel exists 'in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial/" (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684)).
"Unreliability or unfairness does not result if the ineffectiveness of counsel
does not deprive the defendant of any substantive or procedural right to which the
law entitles him." Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 372; Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,393 n.17
14

(2000). Two post-Strickland decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court illustrate this
principle. In Nix v. Whiteside, the Court held that Emanuel Whiteside suffered no
prejudice when his counsel's actions prevented him from presenting perjured
testimony in his criminal trial. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157,175-76 (1986). The
Court noted that the constitutional right to testify does not include the right to
testify falsely and that his counsel's conduct did not, therefore, deprive Whiteside of
a fair trial. Id.
Seven years later, the Court held that Bobby Ray Fretwell was not prejudiced
by his counsel's failure to assert a sentencing error based on a case that was
subsequently overruled, but was good law at the time of Fretwell's sentencing. See
Fretwell 506 U.S. at 371-72. The Court noted that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel only exists to protect Fretwell's right to a fair trial and that his counsel's
failure to assert what was later determined to be an erroneous legal claim did not
render his trial unfair. Id. at 369-71.
In both cases, the Court based its ruling on the premise that counsel's actions
did not deprive the defendants of a fair trial, even though the outcome of the
proceeding might have been different but for counsel's actions. See id. at 371 ("Had
the trial court chosen to follow [the overruled legal claim], counsel's error would
have deprived [Fretwell] of the chance to have the state court make an error in his
favor." (citation and quotations omitted)); Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 175-76 ("Even if we
15

were to assume that the jury might have believed his perjury, it does not follow that
Whiteside was prejudiced."). Similarly, an error by counsel might affect the
outcome of plea negotiations by causing a defendant to reject a favorable plea
bargain. But a favorable plea bargain is not a substantive or procedural right nor is
it necessary to a fair trial. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 (1984) ("A plea
bargain standing alone is without constitutional significance."), [t is not, therefore,
within the scope of those rights that guarantee of effective counsel protects.
Defendant nevertheless claims that he has the right "to effective assistance of
counsel during all critical stages in the proceedings, including plea negotiations and
a motion to withdraw a plea." Br. Pet. at 15. But Knight's is consistent with this
claim. It recognizes the right to counsel during plea negations but clarifies that the
right is violated only if counsel's deficiency prejudices defendant's trial or his right
to a trial. See Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 368 ("Our decisions have emphasized that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists 'in order to protect the fundamental right
to a fair trial.'" (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684)). In other words, while a
defendant has the right to counsel during plea negotiations, he is only prejudiced by
counsel's error during plea negotiations if he accepts the plea bargain and waives
his right to a trial, or if counsel's error reaches forward and prejudices the trial. See
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,59-60 (1985).
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Because Knight is consistent with defendant's claim to effective counsel
during plea negotiations, most of the cases he cites are inapposite to the real issue—
whether a lost plea bargain is prejudicial under the right to effective counsel. Most
of defendant's cases concern claims of uncounseled proceedings, not claims that
counsel was ineffective. Br. Pet. at 14-15.2 But, as explained, the right to counsel is
an express right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and when a defendant lacks
counsel in a critical proceeding, prejudice is presumed. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. A
claim of ineffective assistance, however, requires proof that counsel's deficiency
rendered the proceeding unfair by depriving defendant of a substantive or
procedural right. Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 372.

2

Citing United State v. Garrett, 90 F.3d 210, 212 (7th Cir. 1996) (uncounseled
motion to withdraw a guilty plea); United States v. Veras, 51 F.3d 1365,1369 (7th Cir.
1995) (brief uncounseled period during which motion to suppress was pending);
United States v. Ellison, 798 F.2d 1102,1108-09 (7th Cir. 1986) (counsel at motion to
withdraw a guilty plea had a conflict leaving Ellison "effectively without counsel");
United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066,1069-71 (3rd Cir. 1976) (uncounseled motion
to withdraw a guilty plea); Garcia v. State, 846 So.2d 660, 661 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2003) (same); Martin v. State, 588 N.E.2d 1291, 1292-93 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)
(uncounseled motion to withdraw plea and sentencing); Beals v. State, 802 P.2d 2,4
(Nev. 1990) (per curiam) (same); Randall v. State, 861 P.2d 314, 315-16 (Okla. Ct.
Crim. App. 1993) (uncounseled motion to withdraw guilty plea); State v. Ford, 793
P.2d 397, 403-04 (Utah App. 1990) (uncounseled plea negotiations); Browning v.
Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 360, 362-63 (Vir. Ct. App. 1994) (Browning was
"effectively without counsel" at hearing on motion to withdraw guilty plea); State v.
Swindell, 607 R2d 852,855-56 (Wash. 1980) (uncounseled guilty plea); State v. Harell,
911 P.2d 1034,1035 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (uncounseled motion to withdraw guilty
plea).
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Defendant also cites to several federal circuits that have explicitly recognized
ineffectiveness claims based on a lost plea bargain. Br. Pet. at 14-15.3 These cases
ground their holding, as defendant does, on the premise that the Strickland analysis
"applies to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel involving counsel's advice
offered during the plea process/' Magana v. Hofbauer, 263 F.3cl 542, 547 (6th Cir.
2001) (citing Hill, 474 U.S. at58). But, as explained, Knight is consistent with this
premise. It merely limits reversible errors during the plea process to those errors
that affect a defendant's due process rights. Moreover, disagreement by other
jurisdictions does not mean this Court's holding in Knight was wrong.
There are at least two other states that agree with this Court's holding in
Knight See State v. Monroe, 757 So.2d 895,897-98 (La. Ct. App. 2000), writ denied, 791
So.2d 109 (La. 2001); Bryan v. State, 134 S.W.3d 795, 802-03 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
They recognize, as this Court implicitly did in Knight, that "negotiations which do
not result in a guilty plea, and a resultant embodiment of that plea in the court's
judgment, do not implicate any constitutionally protected rights or liberty interests."
Bryan, 134 S.W.3d at 803. Thus, "by failing to accept a plea bargain [a defendant]

3

Citing Humphress v. United Statesr 398 F.3d 855,858-59 (6th Cir.), cert denied,
126 S.Ct. 199 (2005); Magana v. Hofbauer, 263 F.3d 542,547-48 (6th Cir. 2001); Mask v.
McGinnis, 233 F.3d 132,140 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 534 U.S. 943 (2001); Baker v. Barbo,
177 F.3d 149,154 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376,379-80 (2d Cir.
1998); Paters v. United States, 159 F.3d 1043,1046 (7th Cir. 1998).
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preserve [s] all of his constitutional rights including his only chance of being found
not guilty, and [gives] up none/7 Monroe, 757 So.2d at 898.
Additionally, the federal circuit cases defendant cites rely on an erroneous
interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Hill v. Lockhart. See supra note
3. Hill pled guilty to murder and theft. Hill, 474 U.S. at 53. Two years later, he
sought federal habeas relief on the ground that his attorney was ineffective for
misadvising him as to his parole eligibility. Id. The Court rejected his claim. It first
held that the two-part test from Strickland v. Washington applied to claims of
ineffectiveness in entering a guilty plea. Id. at 370. It noted that the prejudice
inquiry required courts to determine whether "there is a reasonable probability that,
but for coimsel's errors, he would not have plead guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial." Id. It then held that Hill had not shown prejudice under Strickland
because he had not shown that, had counsel correctly advised him, he would have
rejected the plea offer and proceeded to trial. Id. at 60.
In applying Strickland to guilty pleas, the Court did not hold that any error
that alters the outcome of the plea bargaining processes violates the right to the
effective assistance of counsel. It held only that where counsel's deficiency induces
a defendant to accept a guilty plea and waive his right to trial, the plea is
involuntary. Id. at 56-57 ("Certainly our justifications for imposing the 'prejudice'
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requirement in Strickland v. Washington are also relevant in the context of guilty
pleas/').
Hill is thus consistent with prior and subsequent holdings from the Supreme
Court that "the right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its
own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a
fair trial/' Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 482 (2000) (citations and quotations
marks omitted); Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 369 (quotations omitted); Kimmelman477US. at
393(Powell, J., concurring) (quotations omitted); Cronic, 466 U.S. at658. As already
noted, "Unreliability or unfairness does not result if the ineffectiveness of counsel
does not deprive the defendant of any substantive or procedural right to which the
law entitles him." Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 372. A missed opportunity for a favorable
plea bargain does not deprive defendant of a substantive or procedural right
because "[a] plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional significance."
Johnson, 467 U.S. at507. So long as a defendant's conviction is accompanied by the
indicia of fairness required by due process, it complies with the Sixth Amendment,
regardless of mistakes by counsel. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685 ("[T]he Sixth
Amendment right to counsel exists, and is needed, in order to protect the
fundamental right to a fair trial.").

20

G

Defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel's alleged mistake.
In the instant case, defendant admits that his counsel's alleged mistake did

not deprive him of anything he is entitled to. Br. Pet. at 12 ("It is not Grueber's
position that he is entitled to a plea bargain/7). And he does not complain that the
alleged mistake prejudiced his trial. He asserts only that the alleged mistake
deprived him of a more favorable outcome. But due process does not guarantee a
defendant the most favorable of all possible outcomes; it only guarantees that his
conviction will result from a fair proceeding. See Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 370 ("The
touchstone of an ineffective-assistance claim is the fairness of the adversary
proceeding . . .."). Defendant had a fair trial; he is entitled to nothing more. See
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656 ("The right to the effective assistance of counsel is thus the
right of the accused to require the prosecution's case to survive the crucible of
meaningful adversarial testing. When a true adversarial criminal trial has been
conducted . . . the kind of testing envisioned by the Sixth Amendment has
occurred.").
Thus defendant's claim fails.
II. EVEN IF DUE PROCESS INCLUDED A RIGHT TO A PLEA
BARGAIN, DEFENDANT WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED
A PLEA BARGAIN
Non-Utah cases recognizing a right to a plea bargain have held that to show
prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate that but for his counsel's erroneous
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advice, he would have accepted a plea bargain. See Magana, 263 F.3d at 547. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has added the additional
requirement that defendant produce objective evidence that he would have
accepted the plea bargain. See Paters v. United States, 159 F.3d 1043,1046 (7th Cir.
1998). Under that requirement, the Seventh Circuit has rejected claims where the
defendant's self-serving statement was the only evidence that he would have
accepted the plea bargain. See Toro v. Fairman, 940 F.2d 1065,1068 (7th Cir. 1991).
Even if this Court adopted the reasoning of these authorities, defendant's
claim would fail on the prejudice prong. In finding number 15, the trial court ruled
that regardless of his trial counsel's actions, defendant would not have pled guilty:
Based on the initial findings as set forth above, the Court further finds
that the defendant suffered no prejudice from the failure of his trial
counsel to request from the State copies of the recorded jailhouse
conversations. Even had counsel listened to the tapes, or CD's, and
discussed them with the defendant, this Court finds that the defendant
would not have accepted the plea offer from the State because he did
not want to plead guilty to the charge of murder.
(R.455-56).
Defendant claims, however, that the court of appeals erred when it affirmed
the trial court's finding that he would not have accepted a plea and that he knew
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Corcoran had not read his discovery. Br. Pet. at 18-20. Defendant's claim lacks
merit.4
Both this Court and the court of appeals have held that following a rule 23B
remand, the appellate court will "defer to the trial court's findings of fact." See State
v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, f 22,984 P.2d 382; State v. Mecham, 2000 UT App 247,119,9
P.3d 777. Rule 23B(g), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, states that "[t]he findings
of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the same standards as the
review of findings of fact in other appeals." Thus, after a rule 23B hearing, the
appellate court must "defer" to the trial court's findings by reviewing them only for

4

Defendant also challenges factual finding number 13. Br. Pet at 18-19. That
finding states that defendant knew that Corcoran had not read his discovery:
13. Because he had personal knowledge of the date he received his
discovery materials as supplied by the State, and because he further
knew the date Corcoran had been transferred from his cell, the
defendant also knew that Corcoran had not read the discovery
materials and that Corcoran could not be impeached this way.
(R. 455). Defendant's challenge is outside the scope of this court's review. On
certiorari review, this court will only consider issues that are fairly included within
the question presented. See Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4). This court granted review to
consider whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that
defendant would not have accepted a plea bargain even absent counsel's alleged
mistakes. See Order of the Court, April 20,2006, attached as Addendum B. Finding
number 13 was not a basis on which the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
finding that defendant would not have accepted a plea bargain. Thus, even if
finding 13 was clearly erroneous, it is irrelevant to the court of appeals' decision,
and thus outside the scope of, and unnecessary to, this Court's review.
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clear error. See State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, Tf 18,40 R3d 611; State v. Vena, 869 P.2d
932,935 (Utah 1994).
"For a reviewing court to find clear error, it must decide that the factual
findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the record,
resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's
determination/' Vena, 869 P.2d at 935-36. This Court "must sustain the trial court's
judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate
court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made." State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, | 10, 999 P.2d 1252 (quotations and
citation omitted). Moreover, it "is the province of the trier of fact to assess the
credibility of witnesses, and [the appellate court] will not second guess the trial
court where there is a reasonable basis to support its findings." Cooke v. Cooke, 2001
UT App 110, If 11, 22 P.3d 1249 (quotations and citation omitted).
A. Defendant could not have accepted a plea bargain when the State
disclosed the recordings because there was no bargain to accept.
As a threshold matter, defendant could not have accepted a plea bargain
when the State disclosed the existence of the recordings to defense counsel because
there was no plea bargain on the table. The plea offer was made at the first roll call
hearing on November 13, 2001, and defendant immediately rejected it (R. 452;
458:61). The recordings were not disclosed to defense counsel until January 15,
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2002, more than two months after defendant rejected the plea bargain (R. 37-38).
No other plea bargains were offered or sought until defense counsel listened to the
recordings at trial (R. 453; 458:65, 69).
Thus, defendant could not have accepted a plea bargain when the recordings
were disclosed, because there was no bargain to accept. At most, defendant could
only have asked the State to reopen its offer. But any claim that the State would
have reopened the offer is speculative and cannot, therefore, support a finding of
prejudice under Strickland. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (requiring defendants to
show a reasonable probability of a different outcome).5

5

Defendant claimed in the court of appeals that the State would have
accepted a plea to murder up until the trial. Br. Applt. at 21-22. His claim was not
supported by the record. Vince Meister, the prosecutor, testified at the rule 23B
hearing only that the State would have accepted a plea, "[depending on the status
of how the other defendants fell out" (R. 458:73). Defendant's case involved
numerous co-defendants, some of whom testified against defendant (R. 229:17).
Meister also agreed that when the State has a strong case, "as a matter of practice as
a prosecutor, the closer you get to trial and the more preparation you put into trial,
the less inclined you are to talk about plea offers" (R. 458:72). Thus, the question of
whether the State would have reopened the plea offer in this case requires
consideration of a variety of factors, including the prosecutor's view of the strength
of the State's case, the effect the plea would have had on the prosecution of the codefendants, and the amount of time and work the prosecutor had devoted to the
case. There is no evidence in the record concerning any of these factors. Thus,
defendant has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that the State would have
reopened the plea offer. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 16,12 R3d 92 (holding
that defendant bears the burden of assuring that the record is adequate on appeal to
determine his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).
25

B.

Even had there been an outstanding plea bargain, defendant
would not have accepted it.
Even if there had been an outstanding plea offer, the trial court did not clearly

err when it found that defendant would not have accepted it. During a remand
under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the trial court determined that
defendant would not have accepted a plea offer because "he did not want to plead
guilty to the charge of Murder" (R. 456). That finding is not clearly erroneous.
Steven Shapiro, one of defendant's trial attorneys, stated that defendant did
not want to plead guilty as long as the plea included murder (R. 458:41). He
explained that the difference in prison time between a conviction for murder and a
conviction for aggravated kidnapping and murder "wasn't enough to cause
[defendant] to plead guilty to something that he didn't do" (R. 458:42). Shapiro
further explained that "the marginal cost... of the aggravated kidnapping count
wasn't worth the consideration, because he would still be talking about at least 20
years" (R. 458:42). He also agreed that so long as murder was the offer, "it was
fruitless to try and approach Defendant with any sort of negotiated resolution" (R.
458:45).
Additionally, Shapiro never stated that he would have told defendant to
plead guilty had he known about the recordings. He only stated that it "would
have altered a number of different things about the case" (R. 458:31). Shapiro
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refused to "speculate now as to whether or not that might have changed [his] advice
to [defendant]" (R. 458:31). David Finlayson, defendant's other trial attorney, also
testified that "the murder charge would really set his ultimate sentence" and that an
offer to plead to murder "was really considered a no offer" (R. 458:76).
Defendant alone testified that he would have accepted an offer had he known
of the recordings (R. 458:9). However, the trial court's findings implicitly rejected
defendant's self-serving testimony and accepted his attorney's testimonies (R. 45556). See Cooke; 2001UT App 110, Tf 11 (It "is the province of the trier of fact to assess
the credibility of witnesses, and [the appellate court] will not second guess the trial
court where there is a reasonable basis to support its findings." (quotations and
citation omitted)).
Other objective evidence supports the trial court's findings that defendant
would have rejected a plea offer. Defendant told his attorneys that Corcoran may
also have learned the facts of his case from a co-defendant, Larry Rassmussen (R.
458:7,13). Defendant has not shown that this defense was not viable. So long as
there exists a possible alternative defense, defendant cannot say that it is reasonably
probable that he would have accepted a plea bargain to murder. See Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694 (requiring defendant to show "reasonable probability" of different
outcome to prevail on ineffectiveness claim). This objective evidence and the
testimony of defendant's trial attorneys provides an adequate basis to find that
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defendant would not have accepted an offer. Thus, the court of appeals correctly
held that the trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
the judgment of the court of appeals. But if this Court reverses the court of appeals,
it should remand the case for the court to consider whether counsel was deficient.6
Respectfully submitted July 6,2006.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

MATTHEW D.BATES
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Respondent

6

The question of counsel's deficiency was briefed in the court of appeals. See
Br. Applt. at 17-20; Br. Aple. at 9-18. But the court did not reach the issue because it
determined that defendant had failed to establish prejudice. See State v. Grueber,
2005 UT App 480U. If this Court reverses the court of appeals on the questions of
prejudice and the trial court's factual findings, there will remain the question of trial
counsel's performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ("A convicted defendant's
claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction
or death sentence has two components" — deficient performance and prejudice.).
Where this Court's review on certiorari leaves outstanding issues, the proper course
is to remand the case for the court of appeals to consider the issues. See State v.
Maguire, 957 P.2d 598, 600 (Utahl998) (refusing to consider issue on certiorari
review that was not considered by the court of appeals and explaining that "the
proper procedure is for [this Court] to reverse the court of appeals and remand this
case to that court for consideration of [the outstanding issue]").
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
Case No. 20030172-CA
F I L E D
(November 10, 2 005)

Darren Neil Grueber Jr.,
2005 UT App 480
Defendant and Appellant,

Third District, Salt Lake Department, 011916865
The Honorable Robin W. Reese
Attorneys:

Jennifer Gowans, Provo, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Matthew D. Bates, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and McHugh.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Defendant Darren Neil Grueber Jr. appeals his conviction for
murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code section
76-5-203, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (2003), and aggravated
kidnapping, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
section 76-5-302, see id. § 76-5-302 (2003). We affirm.
Defendant first argues that his trial counsel was
ineffective because counsel failed to conduct a reasonable
investigation, i.e., obtaining and listening to audio tapes of
Defendants telephone conversations that undermined the defense
strategy. Defendant asserts that this failure prejudiced him
because it deprived him of the benefit of a plea bargain. Where
a trial court rules on a defendants ineffective assistance of
counsel claim at a remand hearing pursuant to rule 23B of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, see Utah R. App. P. 23B, the
defendant's "ineffective assistance claim on appeal presents us
with a mixed question of law and fact." State v. Classon, 935
P.2d 524, 531 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). "Accordingly, we defer to
the trial court!s findings of fact, but review its legal
conclusions for correctness." Id.
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, as
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, !lla defendant must show (1)

that counsel!s performance was so deficient as to fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for
counselfs deficient performance there is a reasonable probability
that the outcome of the trial would have been different.'" Myers
v. State, 2004 UT 31,1(20, 94 P.3d 211 (quotations and citations
omitted); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96
(1984). "Failure to satisfy either prong will result in our
concluding that counsel's behavior was not ineffective." State
v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288,1(38, 55 P.3d 1131.
Applying these principles to the present case, we conclude
that Defendants claim fails because he suffered no prejudice.
See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1226 (Utah 1993) ("[W]hen
confronted with a claim of ineffective assistance, we may choose
not to consider the adequacy of counsel's performance if we
determine that any claimed error was not harmful."). Defendant
argues that he was prejudiced because, but for his trial
counselfs failure to investigate and discover the defects in the
defense strategy, Defendant would have accepted the plea bargain
offered by the State--to drop the charge of aggravated kidnapping
in exchange for Defendant pleading guilty to murder. However,
Defendant "loses sight of the fact that our state and federal
constitutions guarantee fair trials, not plea bargains." State
v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985); see, e.g., Lockhart v.
Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993) ("Unreliability or unfairness
does not result if the ineffectiveness of counsel does not
deprive the defendant of any substantive or procedural right to
which the law entitles him."). "We have previously rejected
claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel when a
defendant has rejected a plea bargain and has retained his or her
right to a fair trial." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 n.7
(Utah 1987).
These cases are dispositive. Indeed, the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim rejected in Knight--"that counsel
could not advise [the defendant] effectively as to the wisdom of
accepting or rejecting plea bargain offers without the
information that was withheld by the prosecution," id.--is
similar to Defendants claim. Defendant does not cont€>nd that he
was denied his right to a fair trial but only "that he was
prejudiced by his [trial] counsel[fs] deficient performance
during the plea bargaining process." However, because Defendant
has no right to a plea bargain, see Geary, 707 P.2d at 646, he
could not be prejudiced by any purported deficient performance
during the plea bargaining process. Accordingly, Defendants
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel fails.
Defendant also challenges the trial court's finding that
Defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to listen
to the audio tapes because "[D]efendant would not have accepted
the plea offer from the State because he did not want to plead
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guilty to [m]urder.nl We review a trial court's factual findings
for clear error. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah
1994). "For a reviewing court to find clear error, it must
decide that the factual findings made by the trial court are not
adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's
determination." Id. at 935-36. Also, "[i]t is the province of
the trier of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses." Cooke
v. Cooke, 2001 UT App 110, ^11, 22 P.3d 1249 (alteration in
original) (citation and quotations omitted).
The trial court!s finding is supported by the record.
Although Defendant testified that he would have accepted the plea
offer had he known of the recordings and their effect on his
case, both of his attorneys testified that they didn't believe
Defendant would accept a plea that involved murder because having
the aggravated kidnapping charge dropped would have little impact
on his sentence.2 The trial court exercised its discretion in
believing the attorneys1 testimony instead of Defendant's
testimony. This finding is not clearly erroneous. Therefore,
even considering the facts of the case, Defendant suffered no
prejudice from his counsel's alleged failure to investigate
because he would not have accepted the guilty plea.
Accordingly, Defendant's conviction is affirmed.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings,
Presiding Judge

Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge
x

This finding bolsters our conclusion that Defendant was not
prejudiced by his trial counselfs performance.
2

For example, David Shapiro, one of Defendant's attorneys,
testified that from his conversations with Defendant, he
"believed that [Defendant] said he wasn't going to plead guilty
to first-degree murder, and we would go to trial if that's the
best they were going to offer."
20030172-CA

3

Addendum B

Addendum B

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

APR 2 0 2096

The State of Utah,
Respondent,
v.

Case No. 20060009-SC
20030172-CA

Darren Neil Greuber,
Petitioner.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed on January 5, 2006.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted only as to the following issues:
1.

Whether an attorney's failure to investigate evidence
that would militate in favor of accepting a plea
bargain may meet the requirement of demonstrating
prejudice for an allegation of ineffective assistance
of counsel.

2.

Whether the record adequately supports the district
court's finding that Petitioner would not have accepted
the State's plea offer even if his trial counsel had
fully investigated the State's evidence.

A briefing schedule will issue hereafter. Pursuant to rule
2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that permits
the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to submit their
briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be permitted to
stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent extraordinary
circumstances, no extensions will be granted by motion. The
parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon its
issuance.
FOR THE COURT:

p //W

M, W

/

Christine M. Durham
Chief Justice

*'• •''«$! KA i joy
C E R T I F I C A l ^ .Q?PJ SERVICE
--'•"Co r/1 V jg

I hereby certify that on April 20, 2006, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or
placed in the Interdepartmental mail service, or hand delivered
to the parties listed below:
MATTHEW D BATES
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
JENNIFER GOWANS
FILLMORE SPENCER LLC
33 01 N UNIVERSITY AVE
PROVO UT 84604
LISA COLLINS
COURT OF APPEALS
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 140230
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
ATTN: SOPHIE ORVIN / JODI BAILEY
4 50 S STATE ST
PO BOX 1860
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860
Dated this April 20, 2006.

D e p u w Clerk

/

Case No. 20060009
Court of Appeals Case No. 20030172
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE Case No. 011916865
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I1H THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

; FINDINGS OF FACT ON RULE
23B REMAND
;

Plaintiff/
vs.

: CRIMINAL NO.

DARREN NEIL GRUEBER, JR.,

011916865

I
i

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court at a hearing on August 24,
2004, pursuant to Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The
matter was remanded to this Court by an Order of the Utah Court of
Appeals, dated April 7, 2004.
The State appeared through Matthew D. Bates and Christopher
Ballard, and the defendant was present and represented by counsel,
Jennifer K. Gowans.

The Court, having heard the evidence offered

by both parties, does hereby make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On November 13, 2001, the State offered the defendant a

plea agreement in this case which would have the defendant plead
guilty to the charge of Murder, a First Degree Felony, and the
State would then ask the Court to dismiss the charge of Aggravated
Kidnapping.

STATB- V. GRUEBER
2.

FINDINGS

PAGE 2

This offer of settlement was conveyed by the defendant's

counsel to him.
3.

The defendant rejected the State's offer, because he was

unwilling to plead guilty to the charge of Murder.

The defendant

was advised by his attorneys that the sentence for Murder would
likely be 20 years in the state penitentiary.
Aggravated

Kidnapping

charge/

nominally benefit him,

the defendant

and would have

Dropping the

felt, would only

little

impact on his

sentence.
4.

The defendant believed/ as did his counsel, that the

defendant would prevail at trial because they felt that the State's
case was weak in that it consisted mostly of the testimony of gang
members and drug addicts who were subject to effective impeachment.
5.

The State did not at any time renew its plea offer after

it was initially rejected by the defendant, even though the
defendant expressed an interest in accepting that offer after the
close of the State's evidence at trial.
6.

On January 11, 2002, the State served the defendant's

counsel with the Fourth Supplemental Response to Request for
Discovery. This document disclosed the existence of the recordings
of telephone calls made by the defendant from the Davis County
Jail. This Response stated that the State would make the defendant
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copies of the recordings if he would provide blank compact discs or
audio cassettes.
7*
County

The defendant was aware while he was housed in the Davis
Jail

that his telephone

calls were

subject

to being

recorded.
8.

The defendant's trial counsel/ Steven Shapiro, and David

Finlayson, did not request copies of those recorded telephone
conversations or listen to them before trial.
9.

One of the State's witnesses at trial was a jailhouse

informant, David Corcoran.

Mr. Corcoran testified at trial that

the defendant admitted his guilt to the Murder and Aggravated
Kidnapping charges in this case.
10.

The defendant and Corcoran were cellmates in the maximum

security wing of the Davis County Jail from November 8, 2 001 to
November 19, 2001. On or about November 19, 2 001, Mr. Corcoran was
transferred into the general jail population and had no further
contact with the defendant.
11.

A part of the defendant's trial strategy was to impeach

Mr. Corcoran' s testimony by attempting to show that Corcoran
fabricated the defendant's confession after reading police reports
and other materials that the defendant had in his possession while
they were cellmates.

In addition, the defendant thought he could

impeach Mr. Corcoran's testimony by demonstrating that Corcoran had
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learned about the details of this case from a Mr. Larry Rasmussen,
who was a co-defendant of this defendant.

Corcoran and Rasmussen

had been housed together in a holding cell at one time*
12.

In some of the calls recorded after Mr. Corcoran was

transferred out of the defendants cell, the defendant stated that
he had not yet received the discovery materials supplied by the
State of Utah,

Therefore, Corcoran could not have learned about

the case details from reading those reports.
13.

Because the defendant had personal knowledge of the date

he received his discovery materials as supplied by the State, and
because he further knew the date Corcoran had been transferred from
his cell, the defendant also knew that Corcoran had not read the
discovery materials and that Corcoran could not be impeached this
way.
14.

While

it

is

true

that

Corcoran

provided

critical

testimony against the defendant, there were eyewitnesses to the
murder who identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the
crimes.
15.

Based on the initial findings as set forth above, the

Court further finds that the defendant suffered no prejudice from
the failure of his trial counsel to request from the State copies
of the recorded jailhouse conversations. Even had counsel listened
to the tapes, or CD ! s, and discussed them with the defendant, this
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Court finds that the defendant would not have accepted the plea
offer from the State because he did not want to plead guilty to the
charge of Murder.
Dated this * 7 day of September, 2004.

ROBIN W. REESE
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Findings of Fact on Rule 23B Remand, to the following,
this iU

day of September, 2004:

Christopher D. Ballard
Matthew D. Bates
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah
84114-0854
Jennifer K. Gowans
Attorney for Defendant
33 01 N. University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84 604

